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Securing the access to a server, guaranteeing a certain level of protection over
an encrypted communication channel, executing particular counter measures
when attacks are detected are examples of security requirements. Such re-
quirements are identiﬁed based on organizational purposes and expectations
in terms of resource access and availability and also on system vulnerabil-
ities and threats. All these requirements belong to the so-called security
policy. Deploying the policy means enforcing, i.e., conﬁguring, those security
components and mechanisms so that the system behavior be ﬁnally the one
speciﬁed by the policy. The deployment issue becomes more diﬃcult as the
growing organizational requirements and expectations generally leave behind
the integration of new security functionalities in the information system: the
information system will not always embed the necessary security function-
alities for the proper deployment of contextual security requirements. To
overcome this issue, our solution is based on a central entity approach which
takes in charge unmanaged contextual requirements and dynamically rede-
ploys the policy when context changes are detected by this central entity.
We also present an improvement over the OrBAC (Organization-Based
Access Control) model. Up to now, a controller based on a contextual OrBAC
policy is passive, in the sense that it assumes policy evaluation triggered by
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access requests. Therefore, it does not allow reasoning about policy state
evolution when actions occur. The modiﬁcations introduced by our work
overcome this limitation and provide a proactive version of the model by
integrating concepts from action speciﬁcation languages.
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1. Introduction
The conﬁguration of network security components, such as ﬁrewalls, intrusion
detection systems, and VPN routers, must guarantee the appropriate enforce-
ment of a security policy. This involves building up an abstract model of the
security requirements expected to be enforced over the system. This model
must provide to the security oﬃcer the appropriate means to deploy over
the system the set of actions that every subject is authorized to perform.
Therefore, the deployment of the policy over the system means enforcing
(i.e., conﬁguring) the security devices that must guarantee the proper be-
havior deﬁned by the policy. Additionally, there is always the hypothesis
that all the functionalities necessary to enforce a given policy are present
and enabled in these devices. As long as the contextual aspect is not dealt
with, such a hypothesis is acceptable: the security requirements are not dy-
namic and, therefore, all the security devices may be enforced once and for
all at the system initialization. The unaccomplished security requirements
are detected from the very beginning, e.g., in an oﬀ-line manner. This may
be the result of a deﬁcient or missing functionality on the security device.
The solution is trivial: the cost of the faulty device is evaluated against as-
surance requirements and the security oﬃcer may proceed to an update or
an upgrade. However, security policies become more and more contextual
and, consequently, more complex. There is a real risk that some security re-
quirements still remain unaccomplished: either the cost of some new security
functionalities is unacceptable or the security devices cannot be frequently
updated with such new functionalities.
We present a solution to this problem. We propose a mechanism for the
dynamic reﬁnement of contextual security policies over systems where secu-
rity devices do not understand, or are not allowed, to deal with the semantics
of contexts. Our approach works as follows. The security requirements are
modeled based on an extended RBAC access control model which provides
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means to specify contextual security requirements. We take our inspiration
in the OrBAC (Organization-Based Access Control) model [1]. The input of
the reﬁnement process is (1) the formal policy, (2) the system architecture,
and (3) the device capabilities or functionalities. Then, as a result of context
activation, not only enforcing the security devices but also changes of their
conﬁgurations are carried out in an automatic manner. Our contribution is
threefold. First, it enhances the OrBAC model by integrating concepts from
action speciﬁcation languages, in order to allow reasoning about policy state
evolution as soon as actions are detected. Second, it allows security oﬃcers
to reﬁne contextual policies over security devices that are either not capable
or not allowed to interpret the contextual data. Third, it beneﬁts policy-
based mitigation scenarios, such as those used by intrusion detection, fault
tolerance, and quality of service processes, in which a policy reconﬁguration
process must follow the detection mechanism that identiﬁed a given event.
Paper organization  Section 2 addresses our motivation. Section 3 sur-
veys related work. Section 4 establishes the core elements of our approach.
Section 5 provides the formal deﬁnition of our proposal and illustrates a
concrete context-aware network scenario build upon our construction. Sec-
tion 6 presents a practical validation of our approach based on existing tools.
Section 7 discusses some open problems and limitations of our proposal. Sec-
tion 8 concludes the paper.
2. Motivation of our Construction
Our work is placed in the PBNM (Policy Based Network Management) area.
The security architecture of a policy-based managed system generally inte-
grates the following entities: the PDP (Policy Decision Point) and several
PEPs (Policy Enforcement Points). We consider the PDP as the central
and intelligent entity in the network. Based on the security policy data and
some algorithms, the PDP decides upon the access control in the network.
Decisions taken by the PDP must be unambiguous. Given the possible in-
consistencies in deﬁning a security policy (i.e., rule conﬂicts), the PDP may
include a conﬂict resolution mechanism which consequently guarantees the
consistency of the policy. The PEP, a security device, is the operational
entity in the network which enforces the decisions of the PDP. Examples of
PEPs are network ﬁrewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), and VPN
routers for the construction of IPsec tunnels. There are two modes of interac-
tion between PEPs and PDP both delegating the responsibility for a decision
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to the PDP: (1) provisioning mode where the PDP, reacting to diﬀerent in-
puts (and PEP queries), proactively provisions the PEP and (2) outsourcing
mode: when the PEP receives a query, it contacts the PDP which makes a
decision, meaning that there is a one-to-one correlation between PEP events
and PDP decisions. Experiments show that the provisioning mode performs
better than the outsourcing mode [22].
The decision made by the PDP generally depends on the activation of
some contexts. The concept of context [10, 36] is used here within the speci-
ﬁcation of security rules which are then triggered when the context becomes
active. We list next some examples of contexts. A more complete taxonomy
of contexts modeling techniques can be found in [13].
• Temporal context  It depends on the time at which a subject
is requesting for an access to the system. For example, common Cisco
routers with time-based ACLs (Access Control Lists) may be considered
examples of PEPs able to deal with the temporal context if and only if
the time intervals do not have a very ﬁne granularity (e.g., seconds);
• Spatial context  It depends on the subject location. This may be
the case of IPv6 mobility: given the risk of a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack in MIPv6 (Mobile IPv6), speciﬁc security rules can be deployed
once new binding updates are detected [rfc 3775];
• Session context  It depends on the establishment of negotiation
parameters, such as network ports or IP addresses. For example, on
VoIP (Voice Over IP) applications, the negotiation of randomly chosen
UDP ports and/or IP addresses may aﬀect the ﬁltering process of ﬁre-
walls that are not aware of such parameters. New functionalities like
those of SBC (Session Border Controler) partially solve these issues.
However, often the same session policy is applied for all users and this
may prove unacceptable regarding users requirements.
• Intrusion context  It speciﬁes security rules to be activated as
a response to an intrusion. For example, a certain IP packet with a
speciﬁc payload, and related to a known attack, triggers the activation
of an intrusion context. This results in an IDS alert which, in turn,
may have been deﬁned as the activating event of a reaction context.
A reaction context may be related, for example, to the deployment of
certain ﬁrewall rules in order to isolate the victim of the attack;
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• User-declared context  It depends on the subject objective (or
purpose). For example, a certain IP traﬃc is not allowed unless the
corresponding IP packets are encapsulated in an IPsec tunnel; there-
fore the IPsec tunnel parameters are part of a context deﬁnition (e.g.,
authentication type and encryption algorithms).
The contextual techniques modeled in [13] are, however, passive. Indeed,
a controller based on such contextual OrBAC model assumes policy evalua-
tion triggered by access requests. It does not allow reasoning about policy
state evolution when actions are observed by the system. We aim to enhance
the model in order to overcome this limitation. Moreover, let us also observe
that PEPs do not necessarily have to provide the functionalities to process
the contextual semantics (e.g., spatial, session or intrusion contextual data).
It is, hence, fair to consider situations in which the enforcement of contexts
by PEPs may prove unsatisfactory for performance reasons; or situations in
which some particular contexts containing sensitive data must not be han-
dled by the PEPs. We aim to investigate how to deploy contextual policies
related to the provisioning mode when, at least, a PEP is not capable, or
allowed, to enforce context-aware policies.
3. Related Work
3.1. Access Control Models
The security policy of an information system may include a wide range of dif-
ferent requirements, such as authentication, authorization, information ﬂow,
and usage control requirements. Specifying administration and delegation
policies is also a more and more important issue, especially in the context
of pervasive distributed systems. The objective of using a security policy is
to represent in an abstract model the set of real-world requirements that are
meant to govern the behavior of the system.
There exists in the literature several models in order to describe in a
unique and unambiguous manner a security policy. However, not all the
models might answer optimally the complete set of security requirements.
Some models like DAC (Discretionary Access Control) or MAC (Mandatory
Access Control) might require important additional administration eﬀorts to
sum up some properties that can, in turn, be satisfactorily described by more
complete models, like RBAC (Role Based Access Control) [47]. A proper
example is the introduction of notions such as roles and hierarchies. Although
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RBAC appears as being restricted to only access control requirements, several
RBAC extensions confer the possibility to handle dynamic security policies
through some common contexts, such as the temporal or the spatial contexts.
For instance, TRBAC (Temporal Role-Based Access Control) extends the
RBAC model and provides constraints, instants and periodicity characterized
by time properties [8]. Similarly, GEO-RBAC extends RBAC providing the
necessary mechanisms in order to deal with geographical constraints through
absolute and logical representations [9].
The Organization Based Access Control model (OrBAC) natively pro-
vides means to express both static and contextual access control require-
ments [1]. Similarly to RBAC, which comes with an administration model
ARBAC [46], OrBAC is associated with AdOrBAC [15] whose main fea-
ture is its self-administration: the administrative policy is speciﬁed using the
same concepts of the security policy model. OrBAC is robust in terms of
administration and pertaining tools (cf. MotOrBAC [3, 37]) and, therefore,
we choose to formalize the security policy using this model. We refer to
section 4.1 for more information about the OrBAC model.
3.2. Policy Based Network Management
The IETF/DMTF settled the terminology of the PBNM architecture in
[rfc 3198]. However several notions need to be clariﬁed. For example, re-
garding the policy server, it is mentioned that as the [rfc 3198] evolved, the
policy server refers speciﬁcally to a PDP. Beside requesting and providing
decisions in the system, the server also maintains a close interaction with
the entire system and consequently the server is perceived by some authors
as including also the PEP. The IETF excluded such a proposal because ven-
dors provide components which behave as either a PDP or a PEP. Moreover,
the policy server deﬁnition should also include the conﬂict resolution aspect.
The authors give no clear indication as to the implementers of policy system
provide conﬂict detection and avoidance or resolution mechanisms to prevent
this situation. All these concepts were addressed and slightly redeﬁned in
the related literature [48]. For instance, the notion of context is used in [rfc
3198] (i.e., particular context) but with a diﬀerent semantic than our context
concept. The particular context refers to a domain policy (i.e., a given set of
entities the security policy operates on) as, for example, a corporate network.
Several proposals suggest deploying security policies over security com-
ponents but without considering contexts. In [31], the security policy is
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deployed over micro-ﬁrewalls, i.e., ﬁrewalls assigned to each host in the net-
work. The policy is centralized at the PDP level and can be dynamically
changed as a result of an IDS alert. The authors informally compare several
technologies in terms of speed and resource consumption for implementing
the micro-ﬁrewall architecture: the Mobile Agents and the CORBA Mid-
dleware implement a distributed IDS and the RMI Middleware is used to
implement the policy updates. A similar work is [49]. Once a security oﬃcer
detects a cooperative intrusion attempt, a response is computed. However,
neither [31] nor [49] give clear indication about the response strategy or the
mapping from alerts to countermeasures.
Many other approaches introduce the notions of context and context-aware
applications in relation with role activation. Proposals like [18] and [19] deal
with the deployment of reactive policies to neutralize security threats. In
[19], the threats are modeled as contexts. Then, standard IDMEF alerts are
mapped to the contexts. In [18], not only contexts but new policy instances
are derived as a result of an alert. The authors discuss about context lifetime,
according to the impact severity and type of an alert. The response strategy
is inﬂuenced by the mapping of the alerts towards new security rules. The
PDP is always the entity that manages the threat contexts, while the PEP
simply includes the enforcement mechanism.
The authors in [12] bring up the notion of context-aware applications mo-
tivated by applications for intelligent homes. In these applications, services
are enabled based on the location of subjects or objects. The policy for-
malization is RBAC-like and the main idea is the activation of roles  the
environmental roles which capture the environmental states or contexts, i.e.,
the locations. It is worth mentioning that this idea can be easily implemented
in IPv6 home-networks, in which IPv6 natively provides location information
at IP level. The main diﬀerence between our approach and the one in [12]
is at the access control model level. In [12], as it is in GRBAC (General-
ized Role-Based Access Control Model), there is the activation of role and
session, whereas in OrBAC we talk about relevant roles in organizations. In
OrBAC, the subjects moving between organizations (e.g., IP packets ﬂowing
through a network composed of security devices  the sub-organizations)
are empowered with some relevant roles which are always active. However,
authorizations depend on a set of conditions regrouped under the native Or-
BAC notion of context which is able to gather a large diversity of conditions.
A better granularity can thus be achieved, compared to activating roles. The
authors also stressed the idea of the easiness in administering their frame-
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work. They provide a graphical tool that facilitates the work of the security
oﬃcer. This is the general trend of current GUI-based industrial applications.
The approach presented in [27] focuses on policy languages enriched with
semantics using Web Ontology Languages (OWL) and RDF (Resource De-
scription framework) [45]. It exhaustively compares the use of software engi-
neering approaches such as KAoS, REI and SWRL. The main advantage of
such approaches is that a common ontology can be spread between organi-
zations. KAoS uses deontic-logic policies with OWL speciﬁcations, oﬀering
tools to ensure conﬂict resolutions. The security architecture is similar to a
PDPPEP one, with the Guard acting as a PDP. However, it is unclear how
this approach can ensure a total policy deployment whenever the enforcement
points lack functionalities. The REI speciﬁcation language is prolog-like and
oﬀers no enforcement model  this is ensured by an external functionality.
REI introduces the notion of policy domain, while OrBAC comes with orga-
nizations and hierarchies of sub-organizations. SWRL allows the deﬁnition
of security rules in an XML syntax but still does not provide a robust speci-
ﬁcation tool and the enforcement is ensured by external functionalities. One
can ﬁrst observe that a semantic security policy language is very descriptive
and this is not always compatible with the aim of simplifying the task of a
security oﬃcer. Though these approaches are suitable for web-services, they
are not optimal for IP scenarios. The complexity of IP-based scenarios is an
impediment to a centralized administration with real time constraints and
frequent policy updates. Nevertheless, it becomes commonly accepted that
a security oﬃcer has to master formal methodologies (languages or models).
Therefore, a strong requirement is a speciﬁcation and enforcement model
with pertaining tools to facilitate this task, as our approach does.
The proposal presented in [33] takes inspiration from the RBAC model.
It takes advantage of the notion of role and uses contexts to model the con-
ditions to be enabled for a resource to be worked with. The motivation is
represented by the various requirements in securing collaborations of ad hoc
coalitions. The main proposals in [33] are: (1) a context modeled with logic
programming and (2) an ontology approach to specify policy and contexts.
The former allows context activation represented by statements such as: if
context attributes C1 . . . Cn then context attribute Cm. Compared with the
approach that we present in this paper, where we combine the OrBAC and
the ECA (Event Condition Action) [6] formalisms, allows going further and
integrate operation such as the detection of the precise moment in which a
context starts or ends. Regarding the ontology approach in [33] to specify
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policy and contexts, it can beneﬁt further operations, such as organizations
interoperability. This can also be achieved in our approach while, as it can be
seen in [11], the combination of the OrBAC formalism and the expressivenes
of general-purpose ontologies, allows a more generic manner of guaranteeing
organization interoperability.
4. Core Elements of our Contruction
4.1. The OrBAC Model
The OrBAC model involves two levels of abstraction: (1) an organizational
level that includes the role, activity, view and context concepts; and (2) a
concrete level that includes the subject, action, object concepts. It uses
ﬁrst order logic to write access control rules in the form of permissions
(Is_permitted), prohibitions (Is_prohibited), obligations (Is_obliged), and
dispensations (Is_dispensed). For example, a concrete permission is derived
as follows:
• ∀ org, ∀ s, ∀ o, ∀ α, ∀ r, ∀ ν, ∀ a, ∀ C,
Permission(org, r, a, ν, C ) ∧ empower(org, s, r)
∧ use(org, o, ν) ∧ consider(org, α, a) ∧
hold(org, s, a, o, C ) → Is_permitted(s, α, o)
The previous expression stands that if the organization org grants role r
the permission to perform activity a on view ν in context C, and if the role r
is assigned to subject s (empower), the object o is used in view ν (use) and
α is considered the action implementing activity a (consider), s is granted
permission to perform α on o.
The main concepts introduced by OrBAC are the following: (1) activity,
regrouping actions having common properties; (2) view, several objects hav-
ing the same properties on which the same rules are applied; and (3) context,
a concept deﬁning the circumstances in which some security rules can be
applied. The context allows the deﬁnition of speciﬁc security requirements
directly at the OrBAC level. Subjects empowered in a certain role in an
organization cannot realize an action on a given object unless speciﬁc condi-
tions are satisﬁed. Hence a context denotes these speciﬁc conditions in which
an access rule is activated. The dynamic management of contexts to control
the deployment and the redeployment of security policies is further explained
in Section 5.2. OrBAC deﬁnes role hierarchies (as RBAC), and also views,
activities and context hierarchies. In the specialization (or generalization)
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hierarchy, permissions and prohibitions are inherited in a downward man-
ner. These hierarchies facilitate the tasks of the security oﬃcer. They also
simplify the formalization of the security policy.
In the following sections we describe our main hypotheses intended for
the deployment of an OrBAC security policy P deﬁned over a set of ele-
mentary contexts denoted by C. We assume that a set of n PEPs, PEPi, is
responsible for enforcing the policy, yet each PEPi manages only a subset Ci
of contexts. According to the OrBAC model we consider the following SR
security rule format: SR = (Decision, Role, Activity, View, Context) (i.e.,
OrBAC organizational level), where Decision ∈ {Permission, Prohibition}.
We call upon a simple algebra when combining elementary contexts: ∧ (a
rule involving the conjunction of two contexts C1 ∧ C2 is triggered when
both contexts hold), ∨ (a rule is triggered when at least one context holds)
and ¬ (a rule is triggered when the context does not hold).
4.2. Main Hypotheses
First, we assume that an OrBAC policy P is managed at the PDP level.
The PDP represents the intelligent entity of the system. The PDP itself can
manage a subset CPDP of contexts in C. For each rule SRk in P, the set PEPi
of PEPs in charge of enforcing SRk is known. This assumption is based either
(1) on the oﬃcer's explicit indication regarding the optimal PEPi in terms
of right functionalities and right emplacement in the system; or (2) based on
approaches like[42], in which given the network architecture, the PEPs are
selected based on the functionalities required by some actions and contexts
 and also based on the network paths that the IP packets establish between
a source and a destination.
Regarding the context algebra, we consider that if an entity manages con-
texts C1 and C2, it will also be able to manage the context C1 ∧ C2. If an
entity manages the context Ci, it is also able to manage the context ¬Ci. We
believe these hypotheses are not restrictive but fairly reﬂect a reality.
4.3. Methodology
Let us consider SR = (Decision, Role, Activity, View, C) a security rule
of the policy P (SR ∈ P) and SR′ = (Decision, Role, Activity, View, C′).
We call SR′ the SR contextual version over the context C′. Let PEPi be
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an enforcement point able to manage only the context C′ and SR be the
security rule PEPi must enforce. We consider that SR
′ can be deployed and
thus enforced by PEPi. The ﬁnal aim is to deploy the SR rule; one of the
following situations appears:
• Case 1 : the PEPi manages the entire C context. The rule SR is directly
deployed over PEPi and the PDP does not manage SR anymore. The
deployment is called static. Otherwise, the deployment is dynamic and
consequently, the PDP has to manage a part of the context C.
• Case 2 : the PEPi manages only C2, a part of the context C. In this
case, let us denote as C1 = C r C2. The deployment is dynamic and the
PDP manages C1: the PDP must deploy SR
′, the SR contextual version
over C2 on the PEPi when C1 becomes active. What we understand
by PDP managing C1 is, for example, that PDP can deploy the SR
contextual version over C1 on another PEPj in such a manner that the
two SR contextual versions are equivalent to a single SR deployed on
a well placed PEP which includes all functionalities required by the
context C; or the PDP is just sensitive to the activation of C1. If so,
once C1 is deactivated, the PDP must be able to retrieve the deployed
SR′ from PEPi.
• Case 3 : the PEPi manages only C2 and the PDP cannot manage C1.
A possibility would be to search for a part of the C1 context, manage-
able by the PDP and then to deploy the SR contextual version over C2
on PEPi. It is clear that the initial security objective is only partially
satisﬁed. Nevertheless this may prove unacceptable regarding, for ex-
ample, initial assurance requirements; that is why we choose to stop
the SR deployment in this case.
4.4. Limitation of the Current Formalism
An early conclusion that can be extracted from this section is that by simply
relying on the OrBAC formalism we cannot specify the concrete moment at
which a context C speciﬁcally starts or ends. Indeed, the classical OrBAC
context deﬁnition does not include dynamic factors. An OrBAC context
holds if a set of logical preconditions hold. However, the dynamism of security
requirements and the evolution of environmental parameters, for instance,
prove that the OrBAC formalism alone is insuﬃcient. Otherwise, we would
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be limited to the single management of static deployments where, a classical
OrBAC policy would be deployed once and for all at system initialization.
Therefore, an administration tool implementing the downward process of a
classical OrBAC policy would prove unsatisfactory. Such administration tool
should be able to implement a diﬀerent policy deployment: deriving security
rules correlated with some events that we call policy deployment triggering
events. Thus, the deployed rules are continuously adapted to ﬁt the security
requirements in the new contexts.
To solve this limitation, we propose to enrich the OrBAC model with
a new type of context deﬁnition reﬂecting the activation and the deactiva-
tion of a given context C  hereinafter deﬁned as, respectively, Start(C)
and End(C). To do so, we propose to combine the proposal presented in
this section together with the use of the ECA (Event Condition Action) for-
malism [6]. We present this improvement in the sequel, by formalizing the
deﬁnition of context activation and triggered actions.
5. Dynamic Activation of Contexts
Baral et al. introduced in [6] a framework for describing active databases
and their evolution through events and the actions they cause. We base our
approach on the same deﬁnition of ECA (Event Condition Action). After
recalling these concepts we show how they are adapted to the formal descrip-
tion of context activation. Finally, we obtain a complete management of the
policy deployment.
5.1. Use of ECA Rules
The main concepts in [6] (action, event, and active rule) are deﬁned by
using the Lactive language [5]. The Lactive vocabulary includes the following
atoms: A (actions), F (ﬂuents, i.e., data which can change their values), E
(events), and R (rule names). The authors demonstrate that the separation of
event deﬁnition from the active rule allows the speciﬁcation of more complex
events. We resume these deﬁnitions and we capture only the notions we can
use in our policy deployment. Some examples are provided next in order to
show their usage.
1. Action deﬁnition:
• action(X) causes f (Y) if p1(X1), ..., pn(Xn).
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This corresponds to the causality principle; action(X) is an action,
f (Y) is the eﬀect and p1(X1), ..., pn(Xn) are the preconditions of the
action (X, Y, X1, ..., Xn are variables). In any state in which p1(X1),
..., pn(Xn) are true, the execution of the action action(X) determines
f (Y) be true in the next state.
The following two examples use intuitive predicates:
(a) enter(Subject, Room)
• causes location(Subject, Room),
nb_people(Room, N+1)
• if nb_people(Room, N).
(b) tick_clock
• causes time(Global_clock, Time+1)
• if time(Global_clock, Time).
2. Event deﬁnition:
• event(X) after action(Y) if q1(Z1), ..., qn(Zn).
The event X occurs after the execution of the action action(Y) if all
conditions q1(Z1), ..., qn(Zn) are satisﬁed. Event(X) may activate a
rule (active-rule, see bellow) if certain conditions are satisﬁed in the
current state and consequently event(X) is said to be consumed (i.e.,
it does not persist to a future state). Otherwise, for example, the
occurrence of the event alarm_event may be carried on indeﬁnitely if




• if delay(Timer, 0).
(b) alarm_event(Room)
• after enter(Subject, Room)
• if time(Global_clock, Time),Time>23:00.
3. Active ECA rule deﬁnition:
• ECA_rule_name: event(X) initiates a1(Y1), ... ,
am(Ym) if r 1(Z1), ... , rn(Zn).
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The occurrence of event(X) triggers the execution of the action se-
quence a1(Y1), ..., am(Ym) if the conditions r 1(Z1), ..., rn(Zn) are true.
The authors in [6] also use [] and {} to respectively denote a non in-
terruptible and an interruptible sequence of actions. In our approach
we deal only with non interruptible actions, such as:
(a) call_guardian: alarm_event(Room)
• initiates close(Room), call(Guardian)
• if empower(Guardian,guardian).
The actions close(Room) and call(Guardian) are consecutively exe-
cuted if Guardian was empowered as guardian.
5.2. Dynamic Deployment
In our approach, the occurrence of an ECA event generally corresponds to the
activation of a context which is handled by the OrBAC model. We consider
the security rules may involve two types of contexts:
1. State based context : it corresponds to the classical OrBAC context,
modeled with derivation rules and deﬁned as follows:
• hold(Org, S, A, O, Ctx) :- p1(Y1), ..., pn(Yn);
this means that the context Ctx holds (is active) in organization Org
for subject S, action A and object O if a sequence of conditions denoted
by the predicates p1(Y1), ..., pn(Yn) is true.
2. Event based context : corresponds to the ECA event deﬁnition and,
therefore, takes into account the dynamic aspect of a security policy:
• hold(Org, S, A, O, Ctx) after action(X)
if p1(Y1), ..., pn(Yn);
Two event based contexts, Start(C) and End(C), are associated with each
context C of type state based. They are related to the activation and the
deactivation of C. We also take into account the following contexts: (1)
the context that persists forever after Start(C) and, therefore, no End(C)
is associated with it and (2) the context for which start(C) is activated by
the init action of the system (i.e., when the system is initialized). The
following examples clarify the Start(C) and End(C) notions (given that we
deal with a same organisation, the Org attribute will be omitted in the next
hold predicates).
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1. Temporal Context: the morning context, independent of Subject, Ac-
tion and Object, is deﬁned as follows:
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, morning) :-
Time(Global_clock, T), 08:00≤T≤12:00.
The morning context holds only if the system supplies a clock (Global-
_clock) which can be queried (for to assess Time(Global_clock, T))
and whose replies may be evaluated against the interval 08:00-12:00.
Morning is a state based context to which two event based contexts are
assigned: Start(morning) and End(morning):
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, Start(morning))
after tick_clock if Time(Global_clock, 08:00).
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, End(morning))
after tick_clock if Time(Global_clock, 12:00).
2. Spatial Context (1): the following In_room(r) state based context in-
volves the Location(Subject, r) predicate; r is the identiﬁer of an object
of the type room. The system should provide the means necessary to
evaluate the Location(Subject, r) predicate.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, In_room(r)) :- Location(Subject, r).
The following contexts, Start(In_room(r)) and End(In_room(r)) de-
pend only on Subject ; they are activated as a consequence of the actions
Enter and Exit the room:
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, Start(In_room(r)))
after Enter(Subject, r) if True.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, End(In_room(r)))
after Exit(Subject, r) if True.
3. Spatial Context (2): the Alone_in_room(r) context takes into account
the location of a subject in the room r as well as the number of people in
the same room; the system has to provide means to assess the number
of people in r.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, AloneIn_room(r)) :-
Location(Subject, r), Nb_people(r, 1).
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The context Start(AloneIn_room(r)) is activated as a result of entering
the room with no people or when a diﬀerent subject leaves the room
which initially contains only two people. The End(AloneIn_room(r))
context follows a similar reasoning.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object,
Start(AloneIn_room(r))) after Enter(Subject, r)
if Nb_people(r, 0).
• hold(Subject, Action, Object,
Start(AloneIn_room(r))) after Exit(Subject′, r)
if Nb_people(r, 2), Location(Subject,r),
Subject′ 6=Subject.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object,
End(AloneIn_room(r))) after Enter(Subject′, r)
if Nb_people(r, 1), Location(Subject,r),
Subject′ 6=Subject.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object,
End(AloneIn_room(r))) after Exit(Subject, r)
if True.
Let us now consider a composed state based context, C = C1 ∧ C2. The
corresponding event based Start(C) and End(C) contexts are evaluated using
the elementary contexts C1 and C2:
• Start(C) = (Start(C1) ∧ C2) ∨ (C1 ∧ Start(C2)).
• End(C) = (End(C1) ∧ C2) ∨ (C1 ∧ End(C2)).
If C = ¬C1 and init is the context related to the system initialization,
then Start(C) = End(C1)∨ (init ∧ ¬C1), respectively End(C) = Start(C1).
The notions presented in this section along with the context algebra are
used in the deployment of a contextual policy. Start(C) and End(C), corre-
sponding to the activation and deactivation of a relevant context C (i.e., C
is used in SR rules), trigger in addition the deployment and respectively the
retrieval of certain SR rules. The management is at the PDP level.
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5.3. Deployment Management
The use of ECA active rules represents the principle of our contextual policy
deployment in the PDPPEP architecture. As already described, an ECA
involves a triggering event which corresponds here either to Start(C) or to
End(C) and a sequence of actions; there are only two actions that need to
be deﬁned in order to meet all deployment requirements:
• activate(PEP, Security_Rule)
• deactivate(PEP, Security_Rule)
The ﬁrst concerns the deployment of the SR Security_Rule over the PEP
enforcement points, the second represents its retrieval. We recall, SR = (De-
cision, Role, Activity, View, Context); for space limitation reasons, Decision
will represent a Permission and will be omitted in what follows ([17] shows
how a security policy containing both permissions and prohibitions may be
rewritten into an equivalent one containing only permissions). For each se-
curity rule SR(Role, Activity, View, Context) the following rule is derivable
(cf. Section 4.3):
• SR_version(PEP, Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx, PDP_Ctx).
In the SR_version predicate, the ﬁrst attribute speciﬁes the PEP on
which the SR contextual version over the context PEP_Ctx is deployed;
PEP_Ctx is the part of context managed by the PEP and PDP_Ctx is the
one managed by PDP. The context management is based at the PDP level
and the deployment of an SR contextual version is triggered in the most
general case as follows:
• activate_rule:
 hold(Subject, Action, Object, Start(PDP_Ctx))
 initiates activate(PEP, SR(Subject,
Action, Object, PEP_Ctx))





This expression respects the ECA deﬁnition and uses predicates belong-
ing to the OrBAC formalism. The PDP_Ctx activation (Start(PDP_Ctx))
triggers the deployment of the SR contextual rule. The PEP enforces a con-
crete rule (i.e., involving concrete entities in the form of subjects, actions
and objects), hence the deployed rule complies with the speciﬁc format of
the OrBAC concrete level (SR(Subject, Action, Object, PEP_Ctx)). Given
that the initial policy is an OrBAC organizational policy (i.e., SR(Role, Ac-
tivity, View, Context)) some conditions are classic OrBAC conditions: Em-
power(Subject, Role), Consider(Action, Activity), Use(Object, View).
The retrieval of a security rule from the PEP is derived in a similar way
and is ﬁrst conditioned by the deactivation of the PDP_Ctx:
• deactivate_rule:
 hold(Subject, Action, Object, End(PDP_Ctx))
 initiates deactivate(PEP, SR(Subject,
Action, Object, PEP_Ctx))




Diﬀerent PDP_Ctx contexts may be related to a speciﬁc subject, action,
and object. Hence, the above active rules will be applied to every instantia-
tion of subjects, actions and objects. This may lead to deploy a large set of
concrete security rules over each PEP. If so, the security policy does not take
full advantage of the OrBAC organizational expression (SR(Role, Activity,
View, Context)). Solutions to improve the policy deployment exist and they
take into account the context deﬁnition fashion, more exactly the PDP_Ctx
part of context.
5.4. Deployment Optimization
In this section, we show how to reduce the number of security rules expected
to be deployed over the PEPs.
The most convenient deployment case corresponds to the deﬁnition of
PDP_Ctx independently of subjects, actions and objects (e.g, the temporal
context). The SR rule will automatically be deployed as soon as PDP_Ctx
is active; the ECA activate rule involves a minimum set of predicates:
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• activate_rule: hold∅(Start(PDP_Ctx))
 initiates activate(PEP, SR(Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx))
 if SR_version(PEP, Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx, PDP_Ctx).
The ECA deactivate rule is similarly deﬁned. The hold∅ indicates that
a context independent of subject, action and object is active. Another case
arises when the PDP_Ctx context is dependent only on subject (e.g., the
In_room(r) context which is activated when a subject enters in room r and
deactivated when this subject exits). Before deploying the rule, the subject
must be instantiated. The holdS indicates that the activation of context does
not depend on actions or objects but on subject:
• activate_rule: holdS(Subject, Start(PDP_Ctx))
 initiates activate(PEP, SR(Subject, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx))
 if SR_version(PEP, Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx, PDP_Ctx),
Empower(Subject, Role).
A corresponding deactivation rule using holdS is similarly deﬁned. Here,
the PDP_Ctx activation may actually rely on subjects (S ), actions (A),
objects (O) and/or combinations; hence, there are eight possible context
deﬁnition cases according to: holdSAO, hold∅, holdS, holdA, holdO, holdSA,
holdSO, holdAO, the ﬁrst three being detailed in this section.
5.5. Applying our Construction to a Concrete Network System
In order to illustrate our proposal, let us consider the case of a corporation
with a security policy including contextual requirements. The architecture






















































































Figure 1: Network architecture of our example
Table 1: Default Requirements
The email services are accessible from the Intra zone
The email server activates the smtp service to the Internet
The DNS service is accessible from all zones
The icmp traﬃc is allowed in the Corporate (Corp) zones
The PDP activates the NetConf service with the PEPs
The Administration may access the PEPs via ssh
• the DMZ zone (111.222.1.0/24) includes a multi-server: web (webServ)
and email (mailServ) server; the email server is accessible via imap and
pop from the Intra zone or via a web-mail service from the Internet.
The corporation network brings in a DNS server and the DMZ zone
also contains a signature-based IDS;
• the Administration zone (111.222.3.0/24) comes with the administra-
tion tools: an Admin PC which may access all PEPs (ﬁrewalls and
IDS) via ssh;
• the Intranet (Intra) zone (111.222.2.0/24) is considered the corporation
working area. The Intra equipments may access all TCP Internet ser-
vices during the working hours (w.h., 08:0020:00) and use a protected
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Table 2: Contextual Requirements
All Intra  BackUP_Site TCP traﬃc is protected
During w.h., TCP traﬃc is allowed from Intra to Internet
The pop, imap and smtp are accessible from the Invited zone
These services are blocked after 3 failed logins
The IDS detects the syn-ﬂooding attacks and alerts the PDP
The web server is public if no syn-ﬂooding (s.f.) is detected
Table 3: The OrBAC policy
R1 Permisssion(R_Intra, rw_mail, multi-serv, default)
R2 Permisssion(R_MultiServ, w_mail, Internet, default)
R3 Permisssion(R_Internet, w_mail, multi-serv, default)
R4 Permisssion(R_Corporate, dns, dnsServ, default)
R5 Permisssion(R_Internet, dns, dnsServ, default)
R6 Permisssion(R_DNS, dns, Internet, default)
R7 Permisssion(R_Corporate, icmp, Corp, default)
R8 Permisssion(R_Corporate, icmp, Internet, default)
R9 Permisssion(R_PDP, netconf, PEP, default)
R10 Permisssion(R_Admin, ssh, PEP, default)
R11 Permisssion(R_Admin, TCP, Internet, default)
R12 Permisssion(R_PEP, ssh, Admin, default)
R13 Permisssion(R_Intra, TCP, BkUp, protected)
R14 Permisssion(R_Intra, TCP, Internet, w.h. ∧ in-intra)
R15 Permisssion(R_Invited, rw_mail, multi-serv, !(m.l.f.i.))
R16 Permisssion(R_IDS, alert, PDP, syn-ﬂooding)
R17 Permisssion(R_Internet, WEB, multi-serv, !(s.f.))
channel with the BackUP_Site, i.e., an IPsec channel is required);
• the Invited zone (111.222.4.0/24) is a wireless network. All new invited
equipments dynamically obtain an IP address. The security policy also
speciﬁes a default imap/pop access to the multi-server as long as the
mail-login-failed-invited context is not activated (see below);
• the BackUP_Site (BkUp) zone (111.222.5.0/24) is a geographically dif-
ferent sub-network including the back-up ﬁle server of the corporation.
The corporation security policy is informally presented in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1 introduces the default requirements (i.e., they have to be satisﬁed in
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any conditions). However, ensuring a protected channel Intra  BackUP_Site
is considered a contextual requirement (cf. R13 in Table 3). In what follows
we resume the OrBAC concepts related to the above architecture and we
insist on the deﬁnition of contexts:
• roles : R_Administration, R_Intra, R_Invited, R_DMZ, R_MultiServ,
R_BackUP_Site and R_DNS (these correspond respectively to the
aforementioned zones); the role R_Corporate is the one that all enti-
ties in the subnetwork 111.222.0.0/16 are empowered in. R_Internet
corresponds to 0/0r111.222.0.0/16 (meaning that we remove from the
whole internet range [0.0.0.0, 255.255.255.255] the subnet [111.222.0.0,
111.222.255.255])). R_Admin is the role of theAdmin subject. R_PEP
is inherited by all security devices including the ﬁrewalls and the IDS.
The PDP equipment has the role R_PDP ;
• activities (abstraction of network services): WEB (http and https),
TCP (all tcp services), dns (either intra or inter zone dns transfers),
ipsec (isakmp, ESP and/or AH traﬃc); the netconf and ssh activities
are related to respectively the NetConf and ssh protocols. The r_mail
(read email) activity has two sub-activities: r_pop and r_imap. The
w_email (write mail) corresponds to the smtp service; moreover, in
the specialization hierarchy, rw_mail is a more specialized activity than
r_mail and w_mail and consequently inherits them. The icmp activity
includes all icmp traﬃcs.
The view deﬁnitions follow the same reasoning; the security oﬃcer chooses
either entities or zones on which the above activities are realized. E.g., the
Internet view includes the same Internet zone. The PEP view includes the
security devices on which either netconf or ssh activities are performed. All
interesting views are depicted in Table 3 which resumes the OrBAC security
policy. The process of deriving concrete PEPs conﬁgurations is automatically
realized at the PDP level following our proposed construction. According to
the requirements of Table 2, several contexts must be deﬁned (the default
context which is always true is trivially interpreted by the PEPs with ﬁrewall
functionalities). Based on the active ECA rule generations at the PDP level,
the activation of these contexts triggers the deployment of the related security
rules. Table 4 resumes the deﬁnition of these contexts and the signiﬁcant
ECA rules which are automatically generated.
22
Table 4: Context deﬁnition and ECA rules
(1) protected (user declared)  managed by PEPs IPsec-enabled (PEP_ctx) and by the PDP (PDP_prot)
which updates ﬁrewalls (default context) on the tunnel path. Function path(s, o) returns the list of PEPs
([PEPi]) on the IPsec tunnel path between s and o.
Start / End context ECA rule generation
holdso(Intra, BackUp_Site, Start(PDP_prot))
after boot(PEP1, PEPn) if
start_path(PEP1,Intra,BackUp_Site),
end_path(PEPn,Intra,BackUp_Site).
holdso(Intra, BackUp_Site, End( PDP_prot))




initiates activate(PEPi, SR(R_PEP, ipsec, PEP)),
activate(PEP1,n, SR(Intra, TCP, BkUp, PEP_ctx))




(2) working-hours (w.h.)  temporal context; managed either by PEPs with a temporal functionality or
by the PDP (we consider the latter case).








(3) in-intra  spatial context managed by the PDP.
Start / End context ECA rule generation
hold∅(Start(in-intra)) after enter(person,
Intra_zone) if Nb_persons(Intra_zone, 0).
hold∅(End(in-intra)) after exit(person,





(4) mail-login-fail-invited (m.l.f.i.)  three failed logins in the email server from Invited result in blocking
the email services for the traﬃc causing the failures (End(C) irrelevant); managed by the PDP.
Start / End context ECA rule generation
holdso(S, mailServ, Start(m.l.f.i))
after fails(S, auth, mailServ)
if Nb_fails(S, 2).
holdso(S,mailServ,Start(m.l.f.i)) initiates
deactivate(PEPi, SR(S, rw_mail, mailServ))
if SR_version(PEPi, R_Invited, rw_mail,
multi-serv,!(m.l.f.i)),
Empower(S, R_Invited), Use(mailServ, multi-serv).
(5) syn-ﬂooding (s.f.)  dependent on subject and managed by the PDP, s.f. is activated after a syn-
ﬂooding IDS alert on the web server is raised; s.f. deactivation after a few minutes (e.g., eight minutes).








deactivate(PEPi, SR(R_Internet, WEB, webServ))




if SR_version(PEPi, R_Internet, WEB, multi-serv,
!(s.f.)), Use(webServ, multi-serv).
23
6. Practical Validation of our Approach
In the previous sections, we have seen the formalization of our proposal. In
this section, we present a prototype setup based on two available open source
frameworks that we use to test the practical viability of our proposal. The
ﬁrst framework, MotOrBAC [37, 3], allows the deﬁnition and validation of an
OrBAC-based network access control policy. It also provides the means to
process the downward transformation of the formal policy into the concrete
conﬁguration language of a PEP (e.g., a NetFilter-based ﬁrewall). The sec-
ond framework, EnSuite [21], provides the speciﬁc communication protocol
between the PDP and the PEP of our tests.
Jena API 
Definition of  Abstract Entities 
Definition of  Concrete Entities 
Loading/Saving of Policies 












Figure 2: The MotOrBAC architecture
Figure 2 illustrates the MotOrBAC framework architecture. The OrBAC
API (Application Programming Interface) is used to manage the policies dis-
played in the MotOrBAC GUI (Graphical User Interface). The API uses the
Jena Java library [32] to represent and infer knowledge based on RDF (Re-
source Description framework) graphs [45]. Jena provides several inference
engines. The speciﬁc reasoner used by the OrBAC API is the generic rule
reasoner, a general purpose inference engine that supports rule-based infer-
ence over RDF graphs. Such a reasoner supports both forward and backward
inference chaining, as well as combinations of both strategies. The generic
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rule reasoner uses the associations between abstract and concrete entities
and infers the concrete policy. The transformation from abstract concepts
towards concrete policies is actually used in order to execute the downward
transformation depicted in Figure 3. This process uses a two-step transfor-
mation. In the ﬁrst transformation, the abstract OrBAC policy is reﬁned into
a generic set of security rules. These rules are still independent of any speciﬁc
PEP technology. The second transformation results in a speciﬁc PEP con-
ﬁguration (e.g., NetFilter-based ﬁrewall rules). A detailed description about
the two-step transformation process depicted in Figure 3 can be found in
[16, 42]. The complete OrBAC API, as well as the MotOrBAC tool and the
two-step transformation plugin described in the paper has been developed
by our research team and are all available on-line [37].
Figures 47 illustrate the main functions of the MotOrBAC GUI used in
our tests. These functions can be used by a security oﬃcer in order to deﬁne
both the abstract OrBAC policy and the concrete network entities. Figure 4
depicts the abstract entities of a policy. Figure 5 depicts the concrete entities
associated with the same policy. Also, by using the policiy editor of the Mo-
tOrBAC GUI, the security oﬃcer can assign permissions, prohibitions, and
obligations to the abstract entities, as well as deﬁne contextual data. Once
all the deﬁnitions are completed, the oﬃcer can now proceed with the down-











Figure 3: Downward transformation of an OrBAC security policy
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ﬁrewall rules (cf. Figure 6). The downward transformation plugin does only
infer rules associated with active contexts. This process can be veriﬁed by
accessing the MotOrBAC simulation feature that analyzes the state of every
context (cf. Figure 7). The following sketch sample shows a concrete package
of rules derived from the abstract policy depicted in the previous examples:
iptables -N intra_to_net
iptables -A FORWARD -s 111.222.2.0/24 -p tcp -j intra_to_net
iptables -A intra_to_net src 111.222.2.1 -j RETURN
iptables -A intra_to_net src 111.222.2.54 -j RETURN
iptables -A intra_to_net -m iprange dst-range \
111.222.0.0-111.222.255.255 -j RETURN
iptables -A intra_to_net -j ACCEPT
Regarding the communication protocol between a PDP and one or more
PEPs, several communication protocols can address this issue. For example,
the Simple Network Management Network (SNMP) protocol [rfc 1157], the
Common Open Policy Server (COPS) protocol [rfc 2748], and the NetConf
protocol [rfc 4741] are, actually, solutions that are easy to ﬁnd implemented
in most of todays' support tools. They appear, moreover, in the related lit-
erature in order to implement similar operations as the deployment method
that we discussed in our work. The SNMP protocol is one of the most widely
used protocols by network management tools. This protocol relies on a tra-
ditional agent-manager paradigm, in which the agent is basically a program
running over the equipments of a system; and the manager is a program
centralized by a platform that controls and collects the execution results of
each agent over the system. Most solutions of well known vendors like Cisco
or Check Point base the synchronization and management of their tools on
SNMP or other variants. In contrast, the COPS and NetConf protocols are
essentially of a query-response nature. They have also been reported in re-
cent literature aiming at exchanging policy information between servers and
clients. COPS have been used in [26], for example, to dynamically distribute
IPsec-based VPN policies. The main limitation reported in [22] seems to be
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Figure 4: Deﬁnition of the abstract entities of an OrBAC network policy using the Mo-
tOrBAC GUI
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Figure 5: Deﬁnition of the concrete entities of an OrBAC network policy using the Mo-
tOrBAC GUI
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Figure 6: Downward transformation of the policy
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Figure 7: Veriﬁcation of active contexts
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the handling of XML encoding, as it is not natively handled by COPS, rather
than other protocols like NetConf. For the experimental evaluation of our
approach, we propose the use of the NetConf protocol to deploy and commu-
nicate the packages of rules between PDPs and PEPs. For this purpose, we
use the EnSuite framework to push each corresponding PEP conﬁguration
via its NetConf protocol implementation. The EnSuite framework mainly
consists of a NetConf web-based manager, a NetConf agent and a set of ex-
tension modules. All these components are implemented in Python. The two
main modules are the Yencap-Manager and the Yencap-Agent. On the one
hand, the Yencap-Manager oﬀers a management application built as web-
based GUI. On the second hand, the yencap-agent consists of the NetConf
agent implementation. It supports the addition of new modules as well as
new operations. In this sense, we implemented an OrBAC module as a new
extension module for NetConf that demonstrates the feasibility of our ap-
proach via a provisioning module which we use to remotely conﬁgure (i.e.,
update) the policies of NetFilter-based ﬁrewall PEPs. We show the main
interface of the EnSuite components prior and after the update of PEPs
conﬁgurations in Figure 8.
Motivated by the latency that our approach may impose over real case
scenarios, we evaluate the communication delay of deploying an incremental
set of temporal ﬁltering policies derived from the aforementioned prototype
setup. We assume the following two scenarios during our evaluation: a best
case scenario that comprises the deployment of the policy over a LAN (Local
Area Network); and a worst case scenario where the policies are deployed on
a WAN (Wide Area Network). The following two experiments are carried
out: (1) evaluation of the communication latency during the deployment of
the temporal ﬁltering policies from the EnSuite PDP towards a NetFilter-
based PEP; and (2) evaluation of bandwidth degradation due to the over-
head imposed by setting equivalent rules on a NetFilter-based PEP. The set
of rules are derived from the MotOrBAC framework and transmitted from
the Yencap-Manager to the Yencap-Agent that is executed at the NetFilter-
based PEP. All the rules correspond to the following template: iptables -A
FORWARD -i $Iface -p $Protocol -s $SrcNet -d $DstNet sport $SrcPorts dport
$DstPorts -j ACCEPT . The following table shows the size assigned to each
data set depicted in Figure 9:
# of rules 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Size (KB) 192 383 575 766 958
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Figure 8: Main interface of the EnSuite components prior and after the conﬁguration







































# of loaded non-matching rules
rules without xt_time
rules with xt_time
Figure 10: Bandwidth degradation due to the consecutive loading of NetFilter rules
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We can appreciate by looking at the curves of Figure 9 that the average
time for deploying from one to two thousand ﬁltering rules is lower than one
second in the LAN case scenario; and less than two seconds in the WAN case
scenario. Though ﬁltering sets of more than two thousand rules are rarely
used among organizations, we considered interesting to measure the delays
up to ten thousand rules which, on average, is lower than ten seconds in the
LAN case scenario; and lower than twelve seconds in the WAN case scenario.
With the objective of comparing these results with the alternative of
holding temporal ﬁltering rules directly at the PEP, we conducted a second
experiment to measure the bandwidth degradation that such an approach
may suppose. This alternative solution assumes the possibility that smart
PEPs could manage contexts on their own. Although this option may not
always be possible, i.e., management of provisional context whose activation
depends on some previous actions performed by a human subject, we consider
in the following the use of temporal ﬁltering rules. Indeed, most current
ﬁltering PEPs (i.e., ﬁrewalls) can be upgraded with temporal functionality.
Consequently, PDPs may leave those components to manage their temporal
contexts. NetFilter takes into account the temporal context via the time
option. For example, the following NetFilter rule states that all traﬃc must
be accepted in the interval 08:00:15 to 16:00:15: iptables -A FORWARD -m
time timestart 08:00:15 timestop 16:00:15 -j ACCEPT . Nevertheless, using the
time option can cause a degradation of the ﬁrewall resource consumptions.
As negative result, the network bandwidth may decrease much faster than
using equivalent rules without the time option. We show in Figure 10 a
practical evaluation that proves our claim.
7. Open Problems and Limitations
The Organization-Based Access Control (OrBAC) model, ﬁrst presented in
[1], stems from the work carried out by members of the MP6/RNRT project
(funded by the French Ministry of Research). OrBAC provides a robust mod-
eling solution to address access, network and usage control policies in tradi-
tional IT systems. OrBAC suggests a very expressive and modular formalism
that enables policy administrators to make a distinction between the policy
and its concrete implementation [16]. This is obtained by making an ab-
straction of the traditional access control entities subject, action and object.
While traditional access control models focus on modeling users and roles
only (e.g., the RBAC model [47]), OrBAC adds an abstract view of actions
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and objects using two new concepts: activity and views. This way, in Or-
BAC, subjects are empowered in roles, objects are used in views and actions
implement activities. The concept of organization in OrBAC provides means
to better analyze interoperability and speciﬁcation of hierarchies which, in
turn, leads to a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of collaborative work and information
ﬂow between diﬀerent organizations (e.g., companies and institutions). The
OrBAC formalism and the expressiveness of general-purpose ontologies can
be combined in order of guaranteeing organization interoperability and col-
laboration [11, 2]. Negative authorizations are also allowed in OrBAC, in
order to specify complex policies. As conﬂicts might occur between positive
and negative authorizations, OrBAC provides conﬂict management strate-
gies to detect and resolve such potential conﬂicts [14]. OrBAC is robust in
terms of administration and pertaining tools (cf. OrBAC API, AdOrBAC
administration, MotOrBAC tool and available plugins [3, 15, 37]).
The applicability of the OrBAC model for policy deployment has already
been proved in previous work such as [16, 42, 34, 29]. In this paper, and
compared with approaches in [16, 42, 34], we added the management of
contextual security semantics, and address network access control policies
rather that software-based policies (as the work in [29] does). The motivation
goal was to deploy contextual policies over enforcement points which do not
embed the right security functionalities necessary to handle the contexts.
Our methodology aims to dynamically deploy concrete policies by relying on
a central entity  the policy decision point  in charge of managing the
context whenever the enforcement points lack the required functionalities. In
order to establish the formal framework, we extend passive controllers based
on static OrBAC policies (whose evaluation is triggered by access requests)
into proactive controllers that integrate concepts from action speciﬁcation
languages. The ﬁnal goal is to ensure a complete policy deployment.
We can, however, identify a few limitations of our current work. First of
all, the context activation and deactivation trigger serious computations at
PDP level. With a high frequency, these events may lead to situations where
the PEPs are not updated in real time. Moreover, this may introduce serious
vulnerabilities in the system, since an adversary can use such events to launch
DoS attacks over the PDP. For example, in IPv6 networks the binding-updates
packets could be deﬁned as the event to activate a context of mobility, leading
to the deployment of some ﬁrewall rules in the foreign network. An attacker
can forge such IPv6 packets with the result of useless PDP computations
and ﬁltering rules. A solution to such problem is either (1) distributing the
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intelligence of the PDP so that the events of activating (or deactivating) the
contexts be correlated and that the PDP uses reliable triggering events or (2)
delaying the PDP decisions. The latter idea is not totally new. E.g., certain
Radius server implementations, such as Freeradius [23], use a reject_delay
parameter to delay the Access-Reject messages in order to slow down DoS
attacks. Certainly, the drawback of this solution is the lack of real-time
deployments. Another limitation is identiﬁed at the choice of the PDPPEP
protocol. NetConf uses a tree representation of policies, but our approach
considers a total redeployment/re-computation of the access control policy.
The advantage of our solution is that the redeployed policies are free of
anomalies (the detection of policy conﬂicts is ensured during the downward
process). An improvement would be to consider the redeployment of only
the interesting parts of the access control policy, with a positive result  a
faster redeployment.
Another interesting improvement would be the reﬁnement of policies in
scenarios where PDPs and PEPs are not working together in the management
of a certain context. There are few approaches in the literature that provide
solutions to such a case; and they generally apply optimization methods. For
instance, in [28] the authors choose the best combination of security func-
tionalities that minimize the system's vulnerabilities. Their work is meant
to select the most appropriate security technologies to address the vulner-
abilities in the system. Each technology is considered to match a certain
sub-set of vulnerabilities but potentially introduces new ones. A real value
in the interval [−1; 1] is assigned to each technology-vulnerability couple: −1
if the technology introduces a vulnerability, 1 if the vulnerability is solved or
0.5 if the vulnerability is only partially addressed (or partially created). A
mapping of the targeted technologies to vulnerabilities is therefore manually
deﬁned and given that each technology has a normalized cost, the objective
function is intended to maximize the vulnerability coverage while maintain-
ing a minimum cost of the new technologies and also a minimum set of newly
created (residual) vulnerabilities. The optimization problem is solved using
a genetic algorithm. As we have notated, our approach is slightly diﬀerent
since we deal with the deployment of policies. However, our current approach
can be improved with an always best deployed pattern for the already existing
functionalities in the system: a solution consisting in deploying the policy
by using either a context closely related to the unmanaged one or certain
security functionalities related to the missing ones. The ﬁnal result (i.e.,
the deployed policy) should always meet the initial assurance requirements.
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We would not map vulnerabilities or security requirements to functionalities
but we could consider a context functionalities mapping, the objective being
to ﬁnd the best set of technologies to support each requirement. Another
paradigm is presented in [20]: the use of attack-tree representations to ad-
dress the network policy enforcement problem. The authors in [20] propose
to quantify the damage following an attack and the cost related to the im-
plementation of new security controls; both quantiﬁcations follow the same
cost model. The optimization problem, solved with a genetic algorithm, is
to ﬁnd a minimum security cost that corresponds to a minimum damage.
The solution proposed in [30] employs attack graphs which are obtained
using the MulVal tool [40]. The attack graph is reduced to a ﬁrst-order
logic formula which, in conjunction with a security policy (expressed as a
conjunction of privileges that must not be acquired by the attacker) and
with a security usability (stating those network conﬁgurations that should
never be altered whatever the attacks may be), represents an unsatisfying
formula. Costs are associated with those variables describing (1) changes in
the system conﬁguration and (2) privileges acquired by an attacker. Using
two SAT techniques  UnSAT core elimination [35] and MinCostSAT [50]  a
satisfying solution is derived that represents minimum costs. Our approach is
diﬀerent from those using attack graph models: we deploy a policy based on
a more abstract model than the one dealing with attacker's privileges. Our
methodology is placed prior to the attack graph applications and the result of
our deployment process could be jointly used with such approaches in [20, 30];
our deployment would clearly inﬂuence the attack graph instantiation.
Regarding the use of similar strategies on industrial solutions based on
environmental constraints, such as Network Access Servers, WiFi Controllers,
Session Border Controllers, and to our knowledge, there is no solution propos-
ing a top-down approach leading to a formally proved deployment without
anomalies. The experience shows that today's (security) administrators work
with too many subjects and not enough roles, activities or views, leading
thus to a large number of rules (e.g., security rules, security remote access
strategies, and backup strategies). Integrating an OrBAC-based policy rep-
resentation with an ECA-like top-down deployment process would consider-
ably simplify the administration task. However, it is a fact that the current
industrial applications still implement basic concept since administering a
high-level model for example (in security, backup, data base policy areas)
requires nevertheless solid expertise of the model.
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8. Conclusion
Contextual access control policies provide the means to handle complex secu-
rity system requirements in a ﬂexible and dynamic manner. However, PEPs
(Policy Enforcement Points), such as ﬁrewalls, Intrusions Detection Systems
(IDSs), and VPN routers, do not necessarily have the required functionalities
to manage the expressiveness of these policies. It is also fair to envision situa-
tions in which the enforcement of contexts by PEPs may prove unsatisfactory
for performance reasons; or situations in which some particular contexts con-
taining sensitive data must not be handled by the PEPs. We presented in
this paper an approach to handle these scenarios.
Our proposal enhances the OrBAC (Organization-Based Access Control)
model and allows security oﬃcers to dynamically deploy contextual OrBAC
policies over PEPs that are not allowed to interpret contextual semantics.
The approach has been implemented and evaluated. We have presented the
performance of the communication between PDPs (Policy Decission Points)
and PEPs based on our approach and the use of the NetConf protocol. We
compared the overhead of deploying ﬁrewall rules without contextual con-
straints towards the use of ﬁrewall rules including those constraints. Complex
scenarios will grasp the beneﬁts of our approach and the tasks of a security
oﬃcer are considerably simpliﬁed.
The contribution of our work may also beneﬁt policy-based reaction sce-
narios, such as those used by intrusion detection processes [4]. In these
scenarios, a policy reconﬁguration process must follow those detection mech-
anisms that identiﬁed a given attack or anomaly. The reconﬁguration process
aims at providing long term reaction by ﬁxing the security weaknesses that
allowed the attacks identiﬁed during the detection process. PDPs must en-
sure the consistency of new conﬁgurations that are placed into, and enforced
by, their associated PEPs. Fault tolerance and quality of service scenarios
may also beneﬁt from our work. In these scenarios, PDPs are aware of the
policy of a system as a whole, in order to guarantee the compliance of the
statements and constraints deﬁned by network oﬃcers. At the same time,
they ensure the compliance of the expected objectives, such as reduction of
damage, balanced stability, and proper performances.
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